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Open the default Mail app and the inbox you’d like to manage
Give a two-finger tap on any of your emails to enter edit mode
Use a two-finger drag to select multiple messages.

At the bottom of your iPhone or iPad, tap Mark, Move, or Trash (If it shows Archive, tap and hold on Archive to get a popup menu to Trash messages)

Here’s how that looks on iPhone:

If your Mac desktop is cluttered, here is a PDF document to show you how to de-clutter your desktop.

Please leave any comments at the bottom of this blog message.
Be sure to watch Voice Control, very cool...

Enjoy the video:
Did you know you could lose operation of your scanner by updating to MacOS Catalina? Apple has been saying for years to developers to update their 32 bit software to 64 bit. Well the time has come and some developers have not listened. So now the users of older scanners that required 32 bit software drivers are down and out, or are they?

As it turns out there is a company that has scanner software available now to be able to run most of your older scanners under Catalina.

It is called Vuescan. You can go to their website and download a trial version with no restrictions, to make sure it works on your scanner with Catalina, before you buy.

You can download it from:

If you’ve updated your Mac to macOS Catalina, then you’ll notice a specific app missing; iTunes. You’ve probably heard that iTunes was going away, but now that it’s truly gone, you’ll have to manage your devices differently.
You might have used iTunes to back up or restore your iPhone, sync specific items with your iPad, or simply manage your devices.
The bad news is that you can’t use iTunes on Mac to do this anymore. But the good news is that there is another way and it’s super easy.
Here’s how to use Finder instead of iTunes on Mac to manage your devices.

Connect your device to Mac
Grab your lightning cable and connect your device to your Mac. If it doesn’t open automatically, open Finder using the button your Dock or the menu bar.
Now you should see your connected device in the Finder sidebar. Go ahead and click it and we’ll get started with what you can do!

General device management
At the top of the Finder window, you’ll see your device’s name, storage, and battery level. Right beneath, you have tabs for General and then various media types like Music, Movies, TV Shows, Files, and more.

The General tab gives you a basic maintenance area for your device. And it should look quite similar to what you used to see in iTunes. You have three sections for Software, Backups, and Options.

You can also see the storage used on your device by moving your cursor over the sections of the colored bar at the bottom and have a convenient Sync button.

So, managing your device in Finder is pretty close to doing it in iTunes.

Syncing media
As you move through and click the various tabs to the right of General, you can see your other items just like before and sync what you like. Make your picks and click the Apply button at the bottom of that section to sync.

Keep in mind that if you’re using iCloud for things like your music library or calendar and contacts, you’ll see a message that you’ll need to disable that on your device in order to sync with your Mac.

When you finish with everything you need to do with your device, click the Eject button next to it in the sidebar before you unplug your cable.

Will you miss iTunes for device management?
Managing, syncing, and backing up your device is just as easy with Finder as it was with iTunes.
Enjoy this list of keyboard shutcuts for MacOS Catalina

Possible Relocated Items in Catalina

When you upgrade to Catalina, one of its more curious habits is leaving a folder in /Users/Shared, with an alias to it on your Desktop, named Relocated Items. This is normally put in place to welcome you when you first log into your newly upgraded system. According to Apple (, when you upgrade “all your files and data are carefully reviewed to ensure they’re valid and authorised, undamaged, and in the correct locations.” This Relocated Items folder is supposed to contain those which “couldn’t be moved to their new locations” on the System and Data volumes, and with them is a PDF document explaining what to do about them.

If you’re really lucky, the same can happen again, during a Catalina update, or when upgrading from a Catalina beta version. If there’s already a Relocated Items folder in the /Users/Shared folder, then you’ll be pleased to know that the existing folder will be renamed Previously Relocated Items, and the newly relocated items placed in a new folder named Relocated Items.

Why are there Relocated Items?
During the installation of Catalina, macOS transforms your regular single boot volume into two: the new read-only System volume, and its companion Data volume which contains all the writeable files such as your Home folder. These two volumes make up a Volume Group, which is rooted in the System volume. As that’s read-only, its folder layout is fixed, unlike that of your old boot volume.

(NOTE: Right click to open a full size of the images)

This converts a Mojave volume which looks roughly like this:

together with anything your or others might have added, into the new root System volume, which looks like this:

Although the installer knows where to put most things, there are often strays and unexpected files and folders. You might, for example, have created a new top-level folder, or one of your apps might have written a file somewhere outside of the usual places.

The Relocated Items folder should contain all those waifs and strays found during volume conversion. Rather than silently deleting them, or hiding them somewhere that you won’t find them, the Catalina installer puts them all together in the one folder.

What’s in Relocated Items?
What’s in this folder varies a great deal. In my case, there were a few meaningless bits of detritus from Apple apps. Some users find large Photos libraries, apps, and all sorts of other files. So the first thing you should do is look thoroughly inside the Relocated Items folder, and read the accompanying PDF.

Chances are that you’ll be none the wiser. The relocated items will mean nothing to you, and you’ll be able to put them in the Trash and empty it. If there are important files there, you should obviously rescue them and find them a new home on the Data folder.
Some users have reported that certain files which get put in the Relocated Items folder are protected by SIP, and can’t be trashed. If that’s the case, you should be more attentive to those items, and this suggests that there might be a problem with your Catalina installation. All system files protected by SIP should be relocated correctly, the great majority moving onto Catalina’s new System volume.

If you’re in any doubt what a relocated file is, or why it’s there, leave it for the time being. Come back a bit later and see if you can then make an informed decision about what to do with it. Don’t rush to reboot in Recovery Mode, disable SIP, and do all sorts of other manoeuvres to remove all protected files, for instance. If in doubt, leave the file(s) in that folder and ask for advice.
The latest macOS update is chock-full of ways to better safeguard your data..

MacOS Catalina is live and out now for the masses to download—and Apple being Apple, it's packed with features focused on user security and privacy. Here's how Catalina promises to make your Mac safer and better protected than ever, from warnings about weak passwords to smart ways to retrieve a lost MacBook.

Improved Data Protection.
MacOS Catalina makes apps jump through more hoops—as in, forcing them to ask for permission—if they want to access the parts of your computer where documents and other personal files are kept. That includes iCloud Drive and external drives, for example.

Another change, which isn't as visible to end users, is that macOS itself is now being stored on a separate disk volume. In other words, it's isolated from the rest of your data and programs, so apps won't be able to mess with important system files; they simply won't have access to them.

Weak Password Warnings.
Safari on both macOS and iOS has been pushing better password security for a while now, but with Catalina's arrival, the desktop browser will actively warn you if you sign into a site with a weak password—one that's short and simple enough to be easily cracked.

When this happens, you'll be prompted to change your password to something stronger, though you can ignore the advice. When you sign up on a new site, meanwhile, Safari recommends a new, strong password for you that it'll then remember.

To see all of your passwords, and to see which ones Safari has detected as weak or duplicated, open Preferences from the Safari menu and choose Passwords.

Sender-Block in Mail
You no longer have to put up with emails from unwanted contacts, because Mail in macOS Catalina has been upgraded to let you block senders. With an email open, click the arrow next to the sender name, then choose Block Contact. All future emails from that individual will go straight to the Trash folder.
To see a list of all the senders you've blocked, and to unblock them if you're feeling charitable, go to Mail > Preferences > Junk Mail > Blocked. You can add email addresses to your block list manually here, too.

Better Screen Time Limits
With macOS Catalina, Screen Time makes it to the Mac—that means as well as seeing just how much time you spend on Netflix each day, you can also keep your kids safe on a Mac by putting limits on their usage, with these configurations protected with a passcode you specify.

Open up Screen Time via System Preferences from the Apple menu on macOS. The tool lets you put time limits on access to certain apps or websites, and to restrict the viewing of adult content, both on the web and with music and video purchases from Apple. It doesn't just limit the hours your kids spend the computer, but helps you to keep tabs on what they're doing when they are.

Enhanced Gatekeeper Technology
One of the biggest under-the-hood security upgrades in macOS Catalina is to the Gatekeeper component of the operating system—basically the part of macOS that's in charge of keeping viruses and malware off your system. It's now harder than ever for malicious software to do damage to a Mac computer.
In particular, any software installed outside of the Apple-approved walled garden that is the Mac App Store is now checked every time runs for malware and other problems. Previously, this would only happen the first time the app launched. Code from these apps must also be submitted to Apple by developers to be pre-approved as safe, a process known as notarization.
What's more, programs now need to specifically request permission to get access to record what you're typing, or to record what's happening on the screen. That's on top of existing permission management for access to your Mac's location, webcam, and more.

View-Only Notes Sharing
A small change amongst many in Notes with macOS Catalina, but you now have the ability to share Notes (and folders of Notes) with read-only access. That means you can pass them over to friends or colleagues without worrying about them making unwanted edits. With a Note on screen, click the Add people button on the toolbar, then make sure you select Only people you invite can view from the Permission drop-down menu.

'Find My' Mac Location Smarts
There's a new app on iOS 13, iPadOS and macOS Catalina, called simply Find My. It's the place to find out where your devices have gone, and (a little confusingly) where your friends and family are, too.
The new service lets you find a Mac after you've lost it or had it stolen, by tracking down its location on a map. Even if the missing computer isn't connected to the web, Apple anonymously and invisibly enlists an army of iPhones, MacBooks, and other Apple gear owned by other people to to try to detect your Mac's low-energy Bluetooth signal. If another Apple product passes by, you'll be able to know where in the world it went.

Secure Activation Lock
Secure activation lock comes to all Macs with Apple's T2 chip installed, which is those sold in the last year or two. Previously available on iPhones and iPads, it means only you can get into your Mac, and lets you effectively brick it remotely. That makes it less appealing to would-be thieves, who would have to break it down and sell the parts rather than reuse it.

Apple ID Access
This tweak isn't likely to grab many headlines, but you can now get at various parts of your Apple ID account from System Preferences inside macOS, rather than having to go through a web browser each time. Open up the Apple menu, choose System Preferences, and you'll see the Apple ID link at the top.
The new screens let you see devices connected to your Apple account—always useful from a security standpoint—review your email address, phone number, and other personal information, and edit your payment details.

Secure Home Video
As an extension of macOS Catalina, Apple's HomeKit smart home standard introduces tighter guidelines for any home security cameras looking to join the platform. Any kind of detection process—to tell the difference between a car and a human being, for example—must happen locally, while any video stored in iCloud for archival purposes must now be fully encrypted under the new standards.

Adding a volume to an Apple File System (APFS) container on your Mac is a pain-free process and comes with one significant benefit over traditional disk partitioning. With Space Sharing, volumes contained in the same container can grow or shrink as needed, thereby maximizing your device's storage. Something like this wasn't possible during the days of disk partitioning. Let's learn more about adding a volume to an APFS container.
Adding a volume to an APFS container
Removing a volume to an APFS container

What is APFS?
APFS is the default file system on Macs with solid-state drives. By definition, it features secure encryption, space sharing, snapshots, fast directory sizing, and improved file system fundamentals. You can also use APFS on older Macs that include traditional hard drives and external, direct-attached storage — beginning with macOS Mojave, APFS also supported Fusion drives.

APFS was first introduced with macOS High Sierra and replaced the older HFS+ file system. APFS made its debut on iPhone and iPad with iOS 10.3. It's also the file system on Apple Watch and Apple TV.
Apple File System (APFS): What you need to know
Removing a volume to an APFS container

APFS and storage
For macOS users who use partitions, AFS fixes a long-standing limitation. APFS sidesteps the issue of one partition running out of space when there's free space elsewhere on the drive-by creating a container around all the partitions. If a partition needs more space, it can claim it from the container, regardless of whether or not that space is physically adjacent to the partition.

Adding a volume to an APFS container
Before adding a volume, you should back up your Mac as a precaution. From here, follow these steps to create a new volume on your computer:
Select Go on your Mac's Toolbar.
Click Utilities.
Choose Disk Utility.

Click View at the top left of the Disk Utility screen.
Select Show All Devices.
Choose an existing APFS container in the sidebar. In this example, it's called Container disk1.

Click the Add Volume button.
Enter a name for the new APFS volume.
Click the Format pop-up menu, then choose a file system format. See below.

Tap Size Options if you want to manually manage APFS volume allocation. The optional reserve size ensures that the amount of storage will remain available for this volume, while the optional quota size limits how much storage the volume can allocate.
Click OK when done.
Choose Add
Click Done.

You can now use your new volume just as you would any other on your Mac.

Different APFS formats
The different APFS formats are:
APFS: Uses the APFS format
APFS (Encrypted): Uses the APFS format and encrypts the volume.
APFS (Case-sensitive): Uses the APFS format and is case-sensitive to file and folder names. For example, folders named "iMore" and "IMORE" are different.
APFS (Case-sensitive, Encrypted): Uses the APFS format, is case-sensitive to file and folder names, and encrypts the volume.

Removing a volume to an APFS container
If you decide you no longer need a volume on your APFS container, you can delete it using Disk Utility.
Select Go on your Mac's Toolbar.
Click Utilities.
Choose Disk Utility.

Click View at the top left of the Disk Utility screen.
Select Show All Devices.
Right-click on the volume you want to delete.
Click Delete APFS Volume.
Choose Delete.

The APFS volume is now deleted.
If you’ve set up or restored an Apple device recently and have two-factor authentication enabled on your Apple ID, you may have seen a message during configuration that defies your understanding of how Apple maintains device privacy and account security.

The message reads something like, “Enter Mac Password. Enter the password you use to unlock the Mac ‘name here’. This password protects your Apple ID, saved passwords, and other data stored in iCloud. Your password is encrypted and cannot be read by Apple.” The prompt might instead ask for your iPhone or iPad passcode.

I had to take a photo of this unusual login screen, as it was during setup and screen capture wasn’t available.

Doesn’t this seem contradictory, confusing, and just plain wrong? Why would Apple ask for the password or passcode for one of your other devices? Could it be some sort of scam? What exactly is going on here?

I encountered this issue, as did Take Control publisher Joe Kissell, in preparing the iOS 13 and iPadOS 13 revision to my long-running networking and security book, Connect and Secure Your iPhone and iPad. (It has a new, shorter title in this release, and is already updated for iOS 13.1—check it out if you’re looking for more information about iOS networking, privacy, and security.)

While I had heard of this prompt happening once last year, I had never seen it myself. Now I’ve figured out what is going on by reviewing Apple’s documentation and deducing the missing pieces. The short answer is that this prompt is actually Apple working to protect your security, and the explanation is accurate. But it’s not sufficiently detailed—that would require screens of text—to explain what’s going on. Here’s the skinny.

iCloud Stores Two Kinds of Secured Data for You
All the data that’s synced between your devices via iCloud is encrypted while in transit  (generally using HTTPS) and at rest on Apple’s servers. Some of it is available in decrypted form if you were to access it via For that subset, Apple maintains the encryption keys that protect the data when it’s at rest, and it could turn over that data if forced to by law enforcement.

Apple discloses which data is stored with encryption keys it possesses. In very rare circumstances, someone who compromised Apple’s keys or server security could extract that information from a transmission or from iCloud. It’s extremely unlikely, but it’s not strictly impossible.

This data could also be at risk in a successful phishing attack. Phishing requires only that an attacker fools someone into thinking they are entering their credentials into a legitimate site that is, instead, a man-in-the-middle. There are many kinds of phishing attacks, one severe type of which involves obtaining fraudulently issued HTTPS certificates that can have all the trappings of a legitimate and secure site.

The attacker could then simply use your login name and password to initiate an attempt to log in to iCloud, even triggering Apple to send you an extra login token used for two-factor authentication, which, if you entered it on the phishing site, could be used by the attacker at iCloud.

Apple users have been phished, of course, although as far as I know, Apple has never suffered from a fraudulent certificate attack. Some visitors to Google sites were phished in this way on multiple occasions several years ago. Since then, certificate-issuing and -tracking procedures and the way browsers check for legitimately issued documents have substantially reduced but not eliminated that particular risk.
Because of phishing risks, Apple has chosen to protect some data that it views as highly secure or very private with end-to-end encryption that prevents Apple from knowing anything about the contents of the synced data. Apple doesn’t possess any of the keys required to decrypt this data passing through its servers. Instead, those keys reside only on individual iPhones, iPads, and Macs.

There’s a full list of end-to-end encrypted services at Apple’s iCloud security overview page, but they include iCloud Keychain, Screen Time information, Health data, Wi-Fi passwords, the People album in Photos, and the new Find Me service’s crowdsourced location information. There are also likely other bits of data that facilitate device-to-device interactions.

As a result, you cannot view these categories of data at, only using your devices. In essence, iCloud acts as a sync service with zero knowledge about what it’s transmitting. If Apple were asked to disclose this information by a government, it could only produce unreadable encrypted data, by design. (This approach is distinct from the way Apple stores even more sensitive data—credit-card numbers, passcodes, and fingerprint or face parameters—in the Secure Enclave of iPhones, iPads, and Macs with T2 chips. That data never even leaves the Secure Enclave, and much of it is stored in the chip already irreversibly transformed through one-way encryption.)

Apple’s iCloud syncing system relies on public-key cryptography, which uses linked pairs of keys: one public and one private. The public key can be shared freely and used by anyone who wants to encrypt material meant for the owner of the private key, who can then decrypt that data. For iCloud Keychain and similar sensitive data, Apple has your devices generate and maintain a set of public and private keys that enable interaction with the information synced across iCloud. The devices never reveal their private keys and have the public keys of all the other devices connected to an iCloud account.

The data protected in this way is stored as individual packages—for example, a URL, account name, and password as a single unit—and identified with random metadata that’s meaningless except to establish a unique ID for each data package. Devices in the user’s sync set, including newly enrolled hardware, sync by exchanging metadata information. Let’s say your iPhone is missing a Web site login you just created on your Mac. The Mac encrypts the login entry with the public key of the iPhone, which receives it via iCloud sync, and then decrypts it with its private key. This approach is both typical and sensible.

The hard part isn’t syncing data privately. Rather, it comes when you want to add a new device to this set. To understand how that works, we need to understand the role of your iCloud password.

An Extra Element to Protect against Interception
Apple’s iOS 12 security white paper explains this system in some depth, noting that your iCloud Apple ID account password by itself can be used to enroll a new device. That isn’t as worrying as it might sound, because Apple doesn’t know your password. Instead, it stores only an encrypted form of the password. Whenever you enter your password, it’s run through a one-way encryption algorithm that performs a vast number of mathematical operations—the process is called “hashing”—that makes it effectively impossible to determine the original password. (This is also used for a lot of data stored in a Secure Enclave, like your passcode.)

You could enable an iCloud Security Code as an “out-of-band” element—something that is never transmitted by the same means as other data. Out-of-band elements are a common way to block data hijacking by requiring a secret that has never been put online. In this case, it’s something you create or Apple creates for you on one device and that you enter on another.

(Never heard of an iCloud Security Code? You’re not alone! It’s barely mentioned on Apple’s site, and Apple’s white paper doesn’t discuss the code deeply. I recall using one years ago, and TidBITS publisher Adam Engst had never heard the term before editing this article.)

But there’s a flaw in both the iCloud password and the iCloud Security Code approaches, and I wonder if that’s why Apple is now asking for passwords or passcodes from other devices in your sync set. The iCloud Security Code is yet another piece of information to remember and deal with and thus runs counter to Apple’s commitment to simplicity. It was also created when iCloud Keychain was the only set of data Apple secured end-to-end and synced via iCloud, and before both two-step verification and the later two-factor authentication for Apple ID. It may not be robust enough to match Apple’s current security and authentication requirements.

As for the iCloud password, it suffers from a different set of concerns. While Apple doesn’t know your iCloud password, whenever you log in at, your encrypted password is sent to Apple, which holds it just long enough to perform the hash and test it against its stored value. However, it’s not inconceivable—though, again, it’s unlikely—that the password could be captured during that transmission, phished, or stolen in some other way. Apple obviously thinks about it in this way: Since it’s conceivable that the password could be intercepted, Apple has to defend against interception as though it happens every day.

Some companies have tried to move away from the need to transfer even a hashed password. AgileBits, for instance, built around newer browser-based encryption algorithms—no unencrypted passwords or data are stored by AgileBits or ever sent to the browser. Instead, the browser itself performs all the necessary encryption and sends the encrypted data to AgileBits. After login, the servers only send encrypted packages to the user’s browser, which holds encryption keys locally and only for the duration of the session.

Apple hasn’t transitioned to this method with, and so it makes sense that instead of relying on an iCloud password, which could be stolen or phished, it has instead moved to this device-passcode/password system. Apple hasn’t yet documented this new approach, which is why I’m not being more precise about how it all works. None of the text on the screen users see appears on Apple’s support or marketing sites, and there’s no mention of the process in the white paper noted above or elsewhere. But I’ve heard about the process previously from readers, Take Control publisher Joe Kissell recently saw it on setting up a new device, and I finally saw it after upgrading to iOS 13 on my iPhone.

Here’s how the new system works, as far as I can determine:
You log into your Apple ID on the device you’re setting up and confirm a second-factor login. (Password-only Apple ID accounts, which Apple strongly discourages and which we recommend against, don’t seem to get these dialogs.)

On at least one of the devices in the iCloud sync set, Apple adds an encrypted version of that device’s passcode or password to the set of shared information. The only information attached to that payload that Apple can read is the type of device and the name of the device.

Apple syncs this information to iCloud, and the setup process on the new device then pulls it down, prompting you to enter the passcode or password.

Once you enter the correct passcode or password, the new device dumps the passcode/password data from the set, instead generating and relying on a new pair of encryption keys, just like the other devices. The new device becomes part of the trusted set of devices that can sync your end-to-end encrypted iCloud data.

It’s possible that Apple retains the encrypted passcode and password of the shared key for every device that’s in the set. However, that would seem to be an ongoing risk, as it would conceivably allow someone who obtains that secret to gain further access.
What this process appears to show is that Apple never sees, handles, or stores your device passcode or password in unencrypted form, and it never passes the passcode or password over anything but secure transport. It requires only your Apple ID account name and password, sent over HTTPS, as the first stage of logging into iCloud, but not for the later stages.

Overall, this new approach seems rational and secure. Apple would do well to give users more confidence in what’s happening by providing an explanatory support document, and I hope Apple will give in-depth details when it updates the iOS security white paper for iOS 13.